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In the case of a common pool resource such as the 
North Sea, environmental problem solving cannot be 
left entirely to national governments. Some problems 
can be solved only by including the local level, others 
require a global approach. Some responsibilities should 
be left to participants in the public shere, other 
responsibilities can be shared with participants in the 
private sphere. National governments must take into 
account heir interdependency with other participants, 
a situation that has consequences for what is achievable 
and this determines the use of policy instruments and 
the organization of policies. 
The organization and instrumentation of North Sea 
policies as has been developed by governments in the 
1980s seems to be insufficient o reach the targets et. 
The scale of environmental problems facing us today 
demands the development of new machinery, new 
policy instruments, and a new way of looking at the 
process of policy making itself. Can we expect national 
governments to do all the work alone, or should we 
look for a more central role for private participants 
such as user groups and environmental organizations? 
In environmental problem solving the growing social, 
economic, and political interdependence between 
parties is evident. It is time to consider a form of 
steering which involves parties other than just national 
governments. We propose a co-governance approach 
which implies arrangements hat are produced by and 
will be implemented through a network of participants 
involving both public and/or private sectors at the 
international, national, or local level (Godfroij & 
Nelissen, 1993; Kooiman, 1993). 
Developments in North Sea Policies 
The 1980s were important for North Sea environ- 
mental co-operation for several reasons. In a cross- 
national review of environmental policies Weale (1992) 
shows that the anti-pollution strategy of the 'first green 
wave' (1970s) was in fact an approach with a strong 
emphasis on legal instruments. The main strategy in the 
1980s was to involve national politicians in solving 
environmental problems. This more political strategy of 
the 1980s can be seen as a reaction to the failure of the 
strict legalistic approach of the 1970s. 
For the North Sea area the anti-pollution strategy 
changed from an emphasis on international legal instru- 
ments (Treaty of Bonn, 1967; Convention of Oslo, 
1972; Convention of Paris, 1974) to an emphasis on 
international political co-operation: the International 
Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea (ICNS) 
(1984, 1987, 1990, 1993). The change from one anti- 
pollution strategy to another is a matter of years. If we 
take for instance the first ICNS in Bremen in 1984, we 
find parties not yet able to develop a common under- 
standing of principles such as the precautionary 
principle (Hinssen, 1993). Participants also did not 
agree on the actual evel of pollution. It was only after 
these issues were resolved that firm goals on reduction 
of pollution could be set at the London (1987) and The 
Hague (1990) conferences. The most far-reaching oal 
was the 50-70% reduction of input of certain polluting 
substances via different pathways between 1985 and 
1995 (Declarations of the London Conference par. 
XVI and The Hague, par. 2--including Annex 1 a: list of 
priority hazardous substances). 
Today we know that the objectives set at the London 
and The Hague Conferences will not be fully met. With 
hindsight we may conclude that reaching an agreement 
at the Conferences was probably more important han 
thoroughly considering ways to implement it: a case 
where the logic of politics overrules the logic of 
practical thinking? The debate at the intermediate 
conference in Copenhagen on the matter of perform- 
ance is an illustration of the difficulties politicians and 
public opinion have with accepting failure. Admitting 
failure can give reserved countries an argument in 
future negotiations to slow down environmental policy 
making even more. 
The ICNS are taking place against a general 
background of growing attention for the marine 
environment. The number of players participating in 
international forums has grown. One of the reasons for 
this development is the harmonization of activities 
within the ICNS and activities in other fields of water 
management, like the International Rhine Commission 
(Nollkaemper, 1990). For the North Sea this results in a 
growing number of national states participating in the 
policy making process (e.g. the participation of 
Switzerland). The policy making process has become 
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more 'open'. In 1992 the non-governmental environ- 
mental organization Seas at Risk was admitted as an 
official participant in the preparations of the Con- 
ference. Further, the growing number of issues that 
existing forums have to cope with, have led to the 
restructuring of the North Sea policy arena. Recently, in 
1992, the Oslo and Paris Convention were revised (Hey 
et al., 1993). 
We conclude that North Sea policies, as being 
developed in the framework of International Con- 
ferences, have changed in several ways: on the level of 
content of policies (problem-definition, development of
general principles) and on the level of organization 
(number and type of participants, links to other 
environmental/water areas). The question that follows 
is simple. Given these developments, will the political 
approach, as embodied in the International Con- 
ferences, be sufficient o bring about a sustainable use 
of the North Sea by the different user groups? Before 
we can answer this question two different whys of 
looking at the role of governments in the process of 
international co-operation will be discussed. 
Relation Between Government and Society: 
Pyramid or Network 
The legalistic approach in the 1970s assumed the 
existence of national participants with the capacity to 
implement international conventions on a national 
level. The approach is based on the image of national 
governments at the top of a pyramid and societal 
parties at the bottom of a hierarchically organized 
society. In this view governments can steer societal 
participants by a legalistic approach: the basis of the 
pyramid will react to the rules laid down by the top by 
simply obeying them. 
This perception of the relation between government 
and society was quite common in the 1970s and also 
applied to North Sea policies. IJlstra (1986) states that 
no water-area in the world is better covered by rules 
than the North Sea. The question is whether these rules 
actually achieve what they were made for" a change in 
the behaviour of pollutors in order to improve the 
quality of the marine environment. Empirical studies 
show that this is not the case. Peet (1992) conducted a 
study on the application of MARPOL-rules regarding 
operational discharges from ships. He concluded that 
many Contracting Parties are not using all the 
appropriate and practical measures of detection, and 
that reporting of most parties is incomplete. In 
Pallemaerts' (1992) opinion the history of the ICNS 
shows that generating legal substance is not the 
strongest point of this forum. 
In the network perspective governance is a process in 
which both governments and societal participants play 
an active role (Jordan & Schubert, 1992; Van Waarden, 
1992). Policies are being developed in and imple- 
mented through a set of public and private players 
which are each individually incapable but together form 
a network appropriate to perform the task. Public and 
private participants operate in the network, and by 
making choices they either reproduce the network or 
(partly) change it (e.g. by changing the constallation of 
participants). A network is not a stable, institutional- 
ized structure, but reflects a process of constant 
development. I  is a dynamic structure, not a static one. 
In such dynamic situations involving multiple 
participants the instrumentation f policies need special 
attention. In 1992 the Dutch Scientific Advisory Board 
for Governmental Policies presented a report called 
'Environmental policy, strategies, instruments and 
maintenance'. In the report three categories of steering 
were distinguished (WRR, 1992). 
The first is steering by direct rules. This is a highly 
effective way of governing in situations when there are 
guarantees that the rules can be enforced. A classic 
example is the permit. One is allowed to fish at a pond 
when one has a fishing permit. The enforcement is
effective: a law enforcement officer makes his round at 
the pond and asks the fishermen if they can show their 
permits. Violators are either sent away or booked. 
The second is steering by negotiation. An example of 
this category is the covenant between the Port of 
Rotterdam and the German Chemical Industries (to be 
discussed below). Given the range of participants 
involved in the North Sea area, most policy processes 
are negotiated. 
The third category of steering is called social 
governance. This manner of governing is so common, 
that we hardly define it as steering. Social governance is 
based on a commonly shared interpretation of what is 
desirable and what is acceptable. An example of this is 
politeness. To avoid constant conflicts in our daily 
interactions we have developed standards of behaviour. 
And if a conflict escalates, we have judges, who will 
steer by direct rules as discussed above. Common 
understanding between participants, a commonly 
shared frame of reference, can develop only in pro- 
cesses of reasonable argumentation and communica- 
tion. 'Reasonable' in this case means a willingness to be 
prepared to propose and accept good reasons, rather 
than to rely on economic and/or bureaucratic power to 
win arguments (Van der Schans, 1993). 
Dredged Materials: An Illustration of a 
Network (Based on Hinssen & Goverde, 1993) 
The dredged material case provides an example of a 
growing interdependence b tween the local and the 
international level. In this case co-governing means a 
sharing of responsibilities between the national evel of 
government (with the authority to make legally binding 
international greements) and the local level of govern- 
ment (with a direct interest in reducing the level of toxic 
substance flowing in from upstream) and between 
public parties (with a political duty to preserve and/or 
improve water quality) and private parties (with the 
resources and expertise to invest in cleaner technology). 
The Port of Rotterdam produces 23 million m 3 
dredged material annually. More than half of these 23 
mi l l i on  m 3 are polluted with heavy metals and chemical 
substances, carried by the river Rhine from the Ruhr 
area. The dredged material is stored in a large con- 
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structed pit, outside Rotterdam, called the Slufter. This 
is necessary because dispersion at the North Sea is not 
allowed under international agreements made at the 
London and The Hague conferences. The storage 
capacity will suffice until 2002. By then the dredged 
material coming down the river Rhine should have 
reached a level of environmental quality such that it can 
be dispersed at the North Sea. Since the municipal 
authorities of Rotterdam are also responsible for the 
Port of Rotterdam, and the costs of a new Slufter are 
high, they did not want to take the risk that inter- 
national agreements will prove to be insufficient. If 
reduction targets negotiated by the national govern- 
ments could not be reached by 2002, the Rotterdam 
authorities would be unable to disperse the dredged 
materials. Thus they took the initiative and negotiated a 
'covenant' (gentleman's-agreement) wi h the United 
German Chemical Industry. In the covenant the 
Rotterdam authorities agreed not to claim damages 
from the polluting industries, and from their side the 
industries agreed to invest in cleaner production 
technologies. 
An interesting side effect of the Rotterdam initiative 
is that local and national governments make agreements 
with different contents, with the result that polluting 
industries are given (or create for themselves) oppor- 
tunities to negotiate on different fronts. The covenant 
between the municipal authority of Rotterdam and the 
German Chemical Industry is an example of a local 
government acting on its own initiative, and by doing so 
actually influencing the position of national govern- 
ments. 
Organization by Co-governance: Is it Possible? 
By their very nature common pool resources such as 
the North Sea involve a wide range of participants, both 
from the public and the private sector, both at the inter- 
national, national, and local level. North Sea policies 
are influenced already by national governments as well 
as international forums such as OSPARCOM, ICNS, 
IMO, LDC, ICES, and the EC. Many of these organiza- 
tions are linked by mutual representation in each other's 
organizations. For instance, the declarations of the 
North Sea Ministerial Conference are explicit about he 
relationship with OSPARCOM (Hayward, 1990). 
We argue that making legally binding decisions 
without being able to enforce them is the wrong way 
forward. The development of North Sea policies would 
benefit from a common understanding among particip- 
ants that national governments cannot be the only 
parties held entirely responsible for doing the job. User 
groups should take, and in an increasing number of 
cases in fact do take, co-responsibility not only for 
formulating North Sea policies but also for actually 
implementing them and enforcing them. 
One example of co-governance is the surveillance 
system for ships entering the ports of some European 
countries. The innovation is that the responsibility for 
the implementation of IMO and ILO rules covering 
waste discharge, safety, and working conditions on 
board is not left entirely in the hands of the distant flag 
states but is shared with neighbouring receiving 
countries (Port State Control). In a Memorandum of 
Understanding an increasing number of European 
countries have agreed to inspect ships that enter their 
ports and to forbid them to leave the port if they fail to 
comply to the rules. A logical next step would be to 
grant more responsibility to local authorities in coastal 
areas and to port authorities to develop traffic control 
systems and establish safety standards which go beyond 
the compromise levels negotiated in the traditional 
international forums. The US government unilaterally 
established a more strict regime for ships entering US 
waters, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and this may be 
an inspiring example for Europe. 
The recent change in the Dutch North Sea fishery 
policy provides another example of co-governance. The 
Dutch government is delegating some responsibility for 
quota management and enforcement to the fishery 
sector. Groups of fishermen have been formed which 
have agreed to a joint fishing plan to secure a stable 
supply of high quality fish. They have also agreed to sell 
the fish landed in the Netherlands at auction, and they 
can hold each other responsible in court for overfishing 
the group quota. In this way the government's inter- 
national responsibility to control catch effort is 
supplemented by fishermen's responsibility to secure 
the long term profitability of the fishery sector. A 
logical next step would be to delegate the responsibility 
to negotiate the distribution of Total Allowable Catches 
to fishermen organizations atthe European level. 
There are also possibilities for co-governance in the 
field of offshore hydrocarbon mineral extraction. Due 
to the technological complexities and economic un- 
certainties multi-national oil companies co-operate 
intensively when they drill for oil or gas in the North 
Sea. Platforms are generally built by groups of com- 
panies, with one company operating as the operator 
responsible for day-to-day management of the platform. 
Environmental and safety standards are a common 
concern for the group of oil companies exploiting a 
platform, and the group may want to exclude those 
members that do not meet the high standards of 
performance agreed by the group. In this way a govern- 
ment policy of handing out, monitoring, and, if 
necessary, revoking drilling licenses can be supple- 
mented by a group policy of monitoring among oil 
companies working together on the same platform. We 
do not have to look only to governments o punish the 
'bad guys', we can expect something from the 'good 
guys' in the business as well. 
Environmental organizations can also play a con- 
structive role in North Sea policy-making. Last May the 
Dutch Working Group North Sea took the initiative in 
calling user groups together--they were asked to 
present a strategic view on their future use of the North 
Sea. It was the first time in the history of North Sea 
environmental co-operation that non-governmental 
organizations met, not to demand anything from 
national governments, but to try to find out what they 
could do together. Among others, there were delega- 
tions from the shipping industry (Intertanco), the 
fishing industry (the Dutch board of fish and fish- 
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products), the offshore industry (NOGEPA) and 
recreational interests (Foundation Recreation). The 
feasibility of the various views was discussed by experts 
from different scholarly disciplines (ecology, eco- 
nomics, political science, international law). The 
seminar showed that user groups each had different 
perceptions of the problem. In some cases the user 
groups each used a different vocabulary and each con- 
ceived the role governments should play differently. 
In our opinion, meetings like these contribute to 
developing a common understanding of the diversity 
and complexity of the problems and of the limited 
capacity of national governments to solve these 
problems all on their own. 
Conclusion 
There is a growing awareness, both among environ- 
mentalists as well as industrial user groups, that one 
should look not only to national governments o really 
solve the many problems that we are still facing in 
managing the North Sea in a sustainable way, but also 
seek direct interactions between environmental groups 
and industry user groups. This is not an easy road but it 
may well be the only road we can take. 
Governments and societal parties are interdependent; 
this has consequences for what is achievable and for the 
use of policy instruments and the organization of 
policies. We have given some examples of co-operation 
between participants (public-public and private- 
public) in a network, in which direct rules are supple- 
mented with negotiation and social steering, thus 
showing that this alternative for failing legalistic 
approaches is realistic. We believe that a common 
understanding between public and private parties at 
international, national, and local levels provides a basis 
for developing innovative North Sea policies that are 
more realistic, more legitimate, and ultimately also 
more effective. 
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